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Is the Presumption of Corporate
Impunity Dead?
Keynote Address by
Ambassador David Scheffer
at Corporations on Trial: International Criminal and Civil
Liability for Corporations for Human Rights Violations
The Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Conference
Case Western Reserve University School of Law
September 15, 2017
Subsequent to the delivery of this address of September 15,
2017, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Jesner v.
Arab Bank on April 24, 2018.1 In a 5 to 4 vote, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority of Justices Roberts, Alito,
Thomas, Gorusch, and himself, held that corporations are not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).2
Justice Sotomayer, writing for the minority of Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and herself, argued that corporations
can be held liable under the ATS.3 The author aligns himself
with the views expressed by Justice Sotomayer in the dissenting
opinion.

.

David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law
and Director of the Center for International Human Rights at
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. He was the first U.S.
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997-2001). Portions of
this keynote address were incorporated in a Just Security blog by
Ambassador Scheffer entitled, “The Rome Treaty Has Nothing to Do
with
Jesner
v.
Arab
Bank”
(October
10,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/45791/rome-treaty-jesner-v-arab-bank/.

1.

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 2018 WL 1914663 (Apr. 24, 2018).

2.

Id.

3.

Id. at 1 (Sotomayer, S., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U. S. C. §1350, categorically forecloses
foreign corporate liability. In so doing, it absolves corporations from
responsibility under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior. I
disagree both with the Court’s conclusion and its analytic approach.
The text, history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and
consistent history of corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims
for law-of-nations violations may be brought against corporations under
the ATS. Nothing about the corporate form in itself raises foreign-policy
concerns that require the Court, as a matter of common-law discretion,
to immunize all foreign corporations from liability under the ATS,
regardless of the specific law-of-nations violations alleged. I respectfully
dissent”).
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The dialogue at this conference focuses on three broad areas
relating to corporate liability for human rights violations:
accountability, transparency, and morality. I will bore into
accountability, while recognizing up front that impunity for corporate
behavior in the realm of human rights is being challenged with
legislative and stakeholder initiatives in reporting transparency and
development of guidelines, and by expressions of morality at the CEO
level. I point to just one example of guidelines, namely “The
Corporate Crimes Principles,” issued in October 2016 by the
International Corporate Accountability Roundtable in Washington
and by Amnesty International.4 It is an extremely useful set of ten
principles to guide those who aim to hold corporations accountable.
My colleagues in the profession, James G. Stewart and Alex Whiting,
served as experts in the preparation of the principles.
But the force of morality can be stronger than anything we
legislate, anything we uphold in the courts of law globally, and
anything we mandate for reports and other instruments of
transparency, including an aggressive mainstream media and Fifth
Estate. None of us are naïve enough to think that corporate impunity
is somehow gasping its last breath, far from it. But the tide is
turning. The pathway to corporate responsibility, which is being built
in bold defiance of impunity, is not a straight line and it does not and
should not traverse only courtrooms. The issue of overcoming
corporate impunity for human rights violations and how we frame our
analysis of it is, and must be, multidimensional. Professor Caroline
Kaeb, who joins us at this conference, is pioneering innovative ways
to achieve corporate responsibility with non-litigious methodologies.5
But I speak here today of two developments in the field of
accountability.
4.

The Corporate Crimes Principles, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE, Oct. 6, 2016 [https://perma.cc/4BETYVU2].

5.

See generally Caroline Kaeb, A New Penalty Structure for Corporate
Involvement in Atrocity Crimes, 57 HARV. INT. L. J. (Online
Symposium) (2016) also available at http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/
07/a-new-penalty-structure-for-corporate-involvement-in-atrocity-crimesabout-prosecutors-and-monitors/ (noting the use of corporate monitors
to ensure corporate compliance); and Caroline Kaeb, Law, Morality, and
Rational Choice, in Corporate Social Responsibility?: Human Rights in
the New Global Economy 193-206, (Charlotte Walker-Said & John
Kelly, eds.) (University of Chicago Press, 2015) (applying behavior
economics to compliance); and Harlan Loeb, Principles-Based
Regulation and Compliance: A Framework for Sustainable Integrity,
Huffington
Post:
The
Blog
(May
5,
2015
5:24
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/harlan-loeb/principlesbasedregulaton_b_7204110.html [https://perma.cc/M4W9-9MCQ] (working
with Caroline Kaeb to advocate for a principle-based culture in
corporations).
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I begin with the notable case of Jesner v. Arab Bank, which will
be argued before the Supreme Court on October 11, 2017.6 Full
disclosure: I filed an amicus brief on behalf of the petitioners in the
case.7 While the case concerns civil rather than criminal liability, the
fate of corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute,8 and how such
liability is framed by egregious human rights violations, hangs in the
balance, unless the Supreme Court simply invokes the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law in favor of Arab Bank.
I doubt that particular outcome because the Supreme Court
presumably granted certiorari only for the purpose of addressing the
issue of corporate liability; repeating the Kiobel II9 exercise of raising
the issue of corporate liability only to bury it under the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law would be an odd
undertaking and outcome for the Supreme Court. There is a clear
circuit split on the issue of corporate liability, reaffirmed by the 2nd
Circuit in Jesner, so the battle lines are drawn and the time has
arrived. The Alien Tort Statute either covers, as violators of the law
of nations or U.S. treaties, corporations as well as natural persons or
it only covers natural persons. The relatively recent split in the
circuits must be repaired.
In my amicus brief I examine two issues that the Supreme Court
justices should take note of during their deliberations. First, the
Second Circuit and the respondent continue to rely on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter the “Rome
Treaty”)10 and the negotiations leading to its conclusion to deny
liability for corporations. Take it from someone who was there
throughout the U.N. talks: There is simply no basis in the history of
the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaty that prohibits civil
liability of corporations for commission of or complicity in the
commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, the
most egregious types of human rights violations. Our relatively brief
discussions about the status of criminal liability of corporations for
commission of or complicity in atrocity crimes led to a dead end, but
6.

See generally Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, THE SUPREME COURT,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfil
es/html/public/16-499.html [https://perma.cc/AD83-EA4X] (noting the
disposition of the case thus as of Nov. 1, 2017).

7.

Brief of Ambassador David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University
Pritzker School of Law, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners,
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499.

8.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).

9.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).

10.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1,
2002).
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that only speaks to the issue of criminal liability. We were not
discussing civil liability, which is the only form of liability under the
Alien Tort Statute, but has no application whatsoever, even for
natural persons, under the Rome Treaty.
Let me bore into this a bit because this issue remains central at
least to the issue of civil liability for corporations under the Alien
Tort Statute, and if that is eviscerated by the Supreme Court, thus
immunizing corporations, then I suggest that criminal liability will be
much harder to establish in the years ahead. We may need to
strengthen the foundation for civil liability first before building new
frameworks for criminal liability.
The Second Circuit and the respondent assume—incorrectly—that
the Rome Treaty, which exclusively and deliberately focused on the
establishment of a criminal court, purposely reflected a widely
accepted international consensus against all criminal and civil liability
of corporations for crimes against the law of nations, as if corporations
essentially are immunized from any legal liability in their operations.
That incorrect assumption is flatly refuted by the history of the Rome
negotiations and the structure of the Rome Treaty itself, both of
which expressly and solely address criminal liability. The Second
Circuit also wrongly assumes that this purported international
consensus continues to be accepted widely in customary international
law. Even disregarding the fundamental error of its predicate
assumption, the notion that there is a continuing consensus against
civil liability is contradicted by the broad acceptance among legal
systems that public law can provide remedies for corporate
misconduct. Indeed, in addition to the widespread acceptance of civil
liability, there is an increasing acceptance of criminal liability in the
almost two decades since the Rome Treaty was completed.
The Second Circuit and respondent hold a position that, in its
final analysis, would entitle corporations to commit or be accomplices
in atrocity crimes wherever they operate in the world unless there is a
national law on the territory where they operate that outlaws specific
crimes by juridical persons. Luckily, provided the Supreme Court so
rules, in the United States there is the Alien Tort Statute that at
least imposes civil liability on such corporate conduct against aliens,
including when it occurs on foreign territory and, under the Kiobel II
test, touches and concerns the United States.
So, it is true, but irrelevant to the issue before the Supreme
Court, that there was divergence among States and legal systems at
the time of the Rome Treaty’s negotiation regarding the applicability
of criminal statutes to juridical persons that cannot be subjected to
the traditional criminal penalty of deprivation of liberty. Exclusion of
corporations from International Criminal Court prosecution was
inevitable, not because States agreed that corporations are above the
law as a matter of right or of principle, but because a fundamental
underpinning of the Rome Treaty is the preference for and deference
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to domestic prosecution (the principle of complementarity) and the
obligation of State Parties to undertake the capacity to prosecute. If a
legal system did not hold juridical persons liable under criminal law,
then under the Rome Treaty that national system would likely fail
the test of complementarity.
By the way, the U.S. delegation at Rome, which I headed, was
fully aware of the fact that corporations are subject to criminal
sanctions in the United States. Including juridical persons in the
Rome Statute would have been an easy “give” for the United States if
we only had our own jurisdiction to consider. But, given the diversity
of treatment of corporate criminal liability globally, it was not
possible to negotiate a new standard of corporate criminal liability
with universal application in the time frame permitted for concluding
the Rome Treaty. Equally, it was not plausible to foresee
implementation of the complementarity principle of the Rome Treaty
in light of such differences in criminal liability for juridical persons
among so many national jurisdictions. Nor was it possible, in so few
days at Rome, to consider the complex revisions to the long-evolving
text of the treaty that would be required to extend the personal
jurisdiction to corporations.
The omission in the Rome Treaty of provisions for civil
proceedings against juridical persons is utterly insignificant. To the
contrary, the negotiations in Rome leading to the creation of the
International Criminal Court understandably steered clear of civil
liability for tort actions—by multinational corporations as well as by
natural persons—because civil liability fell outside of the selfdescribed criminal tribunal. No conclusion can be drawn, either from
the negotiations leading to the Rome Treaty or from the absence of
corporate criminal or civil liability in the Rome Treaty, that
undermines a general principle of law regarding corporate civil
liability or that prevents national courts from holding corporations
liable in civil damages for torts committed on national or foreign
territory.
Nor have legal systems frozen in time. Article 10 of the Rome
Treaty expressly accepts that international law may evolve for
purposes other than the treaty.11 Since 1998, corporate criminal
liability has been growing rapidly across the globe.12 A significant
number of nations that have ratified the Rome Treaty, indeed 29
countries that I list in my amicus brief, also enacted national
implementing legislation that establishes corporate criminal liability
for atrocity crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Rome Treaty,
11.

Id. at Art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law
for purposes other than this Statute”).

12.

Scheffer, supra note 7, at 6.
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or have adopted comparable laws for the same or other serious crimes.
These States certainly did not act as if the Rome Treaty precluded
expanding corporate liability into the realm of atrocity crimes. Indeed,
one might speculate that the Rome Treaty, by focusing ratifying
States’ attention on atrocity crimes, provided an impetus to accord
greater accountability within their domestic legal systems.
These developments point to the evolving codification of
corporate criminal liability at the national level that aligns with the
long-standing general principle of law of corporate civil liability for
torts that is found in almost all jurisdictions, including the United
States and, with respect to Jesner v. Arab Bank, the Alien Tort
Statute. At the international level, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
an international criminal tribunal, found in 2014 in a contempt case
that corporate criminal liability has become a general principle of
law.13 The respondent scoffs at this ruling, as if the deliberations of a
far-off tribunal are somehow meaningless. I think we know better.
The United Nations International Law Commission is crafting a
Convention on Crimes Against Humanity14 that includes corporate
criminal liability. The commentary on the inclusion of corporate
liability in the draft convention states that the ILC “decided to
include a provision on liability of legal persons for crimes against
humanity, given the potential involvement of legal persons in acts
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population. In doing so, it has focused on language
that has been widely accepted by States in the context of other crimes
and that contains considerable flexibility for States in the
implementation of their obligation.”15 The commentary also provides a
rich source of authorities demonstrating the presence of corporate
criminal liability in multilateral treaties.16 Thus while the Rome
Treaty has been a major impetus in the trend towards corporate
criminal liability in national legal systems, so too have the many
13.

See Press Release, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Panel Decides
on Jurisdiction in Case STL-14-05 (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.stltsl.org/en/media/press-releases/3514-judicial-panel-decides-onjurisdiction-in-case-stl-14-05 [https://perma.cc/T5W9-5P6H] (stating
that legal persons, which includes legal entities, can be criminally liable
under Lebanese law).

14.

See Summaries of the Work of the International Law Commission:
Crimes Against Humanity, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (Aug. 9,
2017),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_7.shtml
[https://perma.cc/VK3B-VJ7G] (showing the Commission’s progress of
work concerning crimes against humanity).

15.

Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/71/10, at 264 (2016).

16.

See id. at 263-64 (providing treaties that address corporate criminal
liability).
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recent multilateral treaties confirming corporate criminal liability for
terrorism, bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions, protection of the environment, transnational organized
crime, corruption, the unauthorized trans-boundary movement of
hazardous wastes, and, perhaps, someday crimes against humanity.
But let us return to the fundamental premise of the Alien Tort
Statute: it is a law that concerns civil liability. While grave criminal
conduct can certainly constitute violations of the law of nations, that
fact does not translate into having to establish that corporations are
subject to criminal liability as a matter of international law in order
to be held responsible for criminal acts, falling within the extreme
degree of torts no doubt, under a national statute of civil liability; it
simply means that the criminality of certain actions, such as atrocity
crimes, in which corporations engage, either directly or as
accomplices, can certainly be subject to civil liability under a national
statute, such as the Alien Tort Statute. Imposing additional criminal
liability on corporations, which has been standard fare in the United
States for certain corporate conduct for more than a century, can be
pursued under other laws and with further legislation. To suggest,
however, that the Alien Tort Statute can only hold corporations
civilly liable if they are subject to criminal liability as a principle of
international law is, frankly, nonsense. The general principle of law, as
a major source of international law—that corporations are subject to
civil liability for torts—remains as strong today as it has in the past.
The bottom line is this: Corporate impunity for violations of the
law of nations or U.S. treaties should not be read into the Alien Tort
Statute based upon a misinterpretation of the Rome Treaty or an
unfamiliarity with the global evolution of both domestic and
international law.
The second issue I want to address is corporate liability under the
Rome Treaty. As it now stands, only corporate officers or employees
responsible for their company’s criminal conduct that falls within the
International Criminal Court’s subject matter, territorial, and
temporal jurisdictions are subject to investigation. I include
“employees” because one must bear in mind that under the
Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (15
September 2016), the Prosecutor leaves open the option of bringing
charges not only “against those persons who appear to be the most
responsible for the identified crimes.”17 She will “first focus on the
crime base in order to identify the organisations (including their
structures) and individuals allegedly responsible for the commission of

17.

Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation, at 14 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N66G-SLDS].
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the crimes.”18
The reference to “organisations” can include a
corporate entity; nothing prohibits the Prosecutor from looking at the
corporation and how it has engaged in atrocity crimes before focusing
on natural persons within the corporation. Do not be surprised to see
corporate officials called as witnesses, avoiding culpability but
shedding light on how the corporation committed atrocity crimes or
was complicit in their commission and thus how the charged
individual fits within the corporate juggernaut and steered it towards
criminal conduct. The prosecution of a corporate President, CEO,
CFO, or Chairman of the Board of Directors will be a de facto
prosecution of the corporation. At least that is a very real possibility
before the International Criminal Court.
I should note that there has been one corporate executive, Joshua
Arap Sang, the former head of operations and well-known radio
personality of Kass FM in Nairobi, Kenya, who faced prosecution at
the International Criminal Court as an indirect co-perpetrator of
three counts of crimes against humanity. He was charged with using
coded messages in his radio broadcasts to commit murder, forcible
transfer, and persecution. This all related to the post-election
violence of 2007-2008. But the Trial Chamber vacated the charges
against him on April 5, 2016.19 The shadow power of witness
interference and political meddling likely intimidated critical
witnesses. The charges against Joshua Arap Sang broke the mold at
the International Criminal Court and essentially put Kass FM—
through the person of one of its corporate executives—on the road to
a criminal trial.
The Prosecutor, in her policy paper, goes on to state that her
investigation and prosecution of those most responsible “may entail
the need to consider the investigation and prosecution of a limited
number of mid- and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately
build the evidentiary foundations for case(s) against those most
responsible.”20 These types of individuals abound in the corporate
world; just ask the investigators immersed in the investigation of
VW21 and other diesel-engine automobiles today. Is it a crime against
humanity by corporate officials to knowingly, willingly, fraudulently,
and illegally cause the emission into the atmosphere of toxic chemicals
that attack civilian populations en masse?
18.

Id.

19.

Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Majority Opinion of Judge EboeOsuji, ¶ 464 (Apr. 5, 2016).

20.

Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 14.

21.

See Jack Ewing, Former VW Engine Chief Arrested, Signaling
Widening Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/business/volkswagen-dieselcheating.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9SW9-VVGH] (reporting the
arrest of a high-ranking executive of Volkswagen).
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Finally, the Prosecutor “may also decide to prosecute lower levelperpetrators where their conduct has been particularly grave or
notorious.”22 This could include employees at low levels who are
perpetrators of atrocity crimes at such a high level of gravity or
notoriety that they cannot, indeed must not, escape justice. In
corporate operations, such individuals are well positioned to
implement higher-level instructions or policies.
It is generally corporations, either privately owned or stateowned, that accomplish the types of actions that the Prosecutor
identified in the policy paper as fair game for her Office’s
investigation: “Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of,
or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the
illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of
land.”23 So corporations that are targeted for investigation, and the
framing of charges, will still focus on corporate officers or employees
and not the juridical person that employs them.
But consider how powerful this tool can become in the future.
Allow me a moment of bluntness. On territorial jurisdiction alone,
multinational corporations are cooked. They operate in and across
many jurisdictions, and one or more of those jurisdictions is likely to
be a State Party to the Rome Statute, or a jurisdiction mandated by
the U.N. Security Council to be investigated by the International
Criminal Court, and where criminal conduct has occurred. On
nationality jurisdiction, multinational corporations are cooked. They
employ nationals of many countries and it is entirely possible that one
of those nationals will be in a position of authority and action within
the corporation in connection with the company’s engagement in
atrocity crimes, even if the crimes are committed on the territory of a
non-party State.
On temporal jurisdiction, multinational corporations are cooked.
There has been enough destruction of the environment, illegal
exploitation of natural resources, and illegal dispossession of land
since July 1, 2002, and even since any State Party joined the
International Criminal Court with respect to its own territory, to fully
occupy investigative inquiries, whether by referral or by initiation of
the Prosecutor.
Finally, on subject matter jurisdiction, multinational corporations
are cooked. The Prosecutor’s list of environmental, natural resources,
and land grab crimes by no means excludes her investigation of
corporate complicity in more direct forms of ethnic cleansing and
other crimes against humanity as well as war crimes. One might hope
that the Holocaust was the last time we witnessed corporate
complicity in genocide, but I fear otherwise. Dean Michael Kelly
22.

Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 17, at 14.

23.

Id.
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addresses that issue masterfully in his recent book.24 For example,
corporations have engaged extensively. Military contractors in
particular, including the manufacturers of weapons, need to be
particularly sensitive to this emerging field of liability.
Of course, there remains the theoretical possibility of amending
the Rome Treaty to explicitly extend its personal jurisdiction to
juridical persons. State Parties could amend Articles 1 and 25(1) to
include juridical persons.
Covering the consequential meaning of including juridical persons
would require extensive amendments to theRome Statute. Careful
consideration would have to be made to distinguish, if necessary,
between natural and juridical persons for purposes of production of
evidence, the exercise of due process rights, proper physical presence
of the defendant (who would appear for the corporation) in relevant
proceedings, state cooperation requirements unique to corporations,
and discerning which penalties are available and enforceable against
corporations in the event of a guilty judgment.25
Then there would be the staffing, at considerable cost, of a whole
new division of the Office of the Prosecutor with lawyers and
individuals of business and financial expertise who know how to
investigate corporate conduct. Of course, such talent already is
required as the Prosecutor turns her attention to corporate conduct
leading to atrocity crimes. The election of at least some judges would
need to turn in part on their expertise in criminal law as it pertains to
corporate conduct. Any group of amendments covering juridical
persons in the Rome Treaty would require approval by two-thirds of
the State Parties pursuant to Article 121(3) and, if that hurdle is
leaped, then such amendments would have to be ratified or accepted
by seven-eighths of the State Parties in order to come into force
pursuant to Article 121(4) of the Rome Treaty.
There might be a different path, namely negotiation of a protocol
to the Rome Statute that would permit State Parties that join it to
“opt in” to coverage of juridical persons. However, such a protocol
may be very difficult to negotiate as it would still have to transform
the Rome Treaty radically to cover juridical persons only for those
State Parties ratifying or accepting the protocol. The protocol would
have to largely mirror the complex amendments required for a
comprehensive overhaul of the Rome Treaty with straight

24.

See generally MICHAEL J. KELLY, PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS FOR
GENOCIDE (2016)(debating a historical and legal liability for
corporations who participate in human rights violations).

25.

See David Scheffer, Corporate Liability Under Rome Statute, HARV.
INT’L L. J. (Jul. 7 2017), http://www.harvardilj.org/2016/07/ corporateliability-under-the-rome-statute/ [https://perma.cc/PE9L-QG79].
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amendments, and may still need to be initially adopted by two-thirds
of the State Parties pursuant to Article 121(3).26
Any empirical study of corporate conduct internationally would
not conclude that the presumption of corporate impunity is dead, as
any reading of the news alone informs us that far too much corporate
misconduct continues unchallenged. Surely, however, the tide is
turning towards challenging the presumption and the reality of
corporate impunity, if not as a matter of criminal law, than as a
matter of reporting requirements mandated by law or by international
organizations or civil society or as a matter of moral decision-making
at the highest levels of corporate management.
Professor Kaeb and I co-chair the Working Group on Business
and Human Rights of the U.N. Global Compact’s PRME initiative,27
where we seek to broaden the curriculum of business schools in
particular to ensure that students understand the importance of
compliance with human rights standards as they enter the corporate
management ranks. We struggle against the view that this is a subject
falling outside business and management instruction, and yet in
recent years there has been a healthy increase in curriculum offerings
and activities that focus on the human rights agenda. That gives me
cause for hope, as would the Supreme Court’s affirmation of corporate
civil liability under the Alien Tort Statute and the International
Criminal Court’s tactful and challenging journey into corporate
criminal liability through the decisions and actions of corporate
officials.
Thank you.

26.

Id.

27.

PRME Working Group on Business and Human Rights, PRME (2016),
http://www.unprme.org/working-groups/display-workinggroup.php?wgid=3306 [https://perma.cc/N83S-LPU8].
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